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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BEFORE 
REALISM  
Jud Campbell* 
This Essay excavates a forgotten way of thinking about the relation-
ship between state and federal constitutional rights that was prevalent from 
the Founding through the early twentieth century. Prior to the ascendancy 
of legal realism, American jurists understood most fundamental rights as a 
species of general law that applied across jurisdictional lines, regardless 
of whether these rights were constitutionally enumerated. And like other 
forms of general law, state and federal courts shared responsibility for in-
terpreting and enforcing these rights. Nor did the Fourteenth Amendment 
initially disrupt this paradigm in ways that we might expect. Rather than 
viewing rights secured by the Fourteenth Amendment as distinctively “na-
tional,” most early interpreters thought that these rights remained a species 
of general law. For several decades, debates instead focused on the extent 
to which these rights were enforceable in federal court, akin to the way that 
federal courts could hear general-law claims in diversity-jurisdiction cases. 
It was only with the rise of legal realism that American jurists began to 
conceptualize fundamental rights distinctively in terms of state (constitu-
tional) law and federal (constitutional) law and to divide interpretive au-
thority into state and federal spheres.  
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How do rights secured by state constitutions relate to those secured by the 
Fourteenth Amendment? For instance, do state-level guarantees of religious and 
expressive freedoms have the same legal content as the “incorporated” federal 
rights supplied by the First Amendment?1 Some state courts say yes. But this 
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 1. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (recognizing the incorporation of the First Amend-
ment against the states by the Fourteenth Amendment); Bennefield v. Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 306, 311 (Va. 
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approach is not required. Modern legal interpretation is largely grounded on the 
intent of the lawmakers,2 so even identical language in different constitutions 
can carry different meanings.3 State constitutional rights need not track their fed-
eral counterparts.4 
Building on this insight, Judge Sutton’s 51 Imperfect Solutions challenges 
us to rethink the relationship between state and federal constitutional rights.5 
“There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter,” he writes, “that constitu-
tional guarantees of independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or 
similar words, must be construed in the same way.”6 Many state constitutional 
rights predated the federal constitution or emerged in entirely different circum-
stances.7 Moreover, he argues, giving state constitutional rights independent po-
tency would accord with values of federalism and would perhaps also “ease the 
pressure on the U.S. Supreme Court to be the key rights innovator in modern 
America.”8 
This Essay aims to show that the federal dominance Judge Sutton laments 
and the state-based “imperfect solutions” he offers reflect modern shifts in the 
way that we think about constitutional rights.9 In particular, Americans used to 
view the state and federal bills of rights as declaratory of rights that were com-
mon across jurisdictions rather than as creating rights specific to that jurisdic-
tion.10 Back then, contrary to Judge Sutton’s suggestion, there was “reason to 
think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional guarantees of independent 
sovereigns” carried the same meaning.11 But this understanding also meant that 
 
Ct. App. 1996) (“Our courts have consistently held that the protections afforded under the Virginia Constitution 
are co-extensive with those in the United States Constitution.”). 
 2. See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 591 (2008). 
 3. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 675 (2006) (“The definition of 
a term in one statute does not necessarily control the interpretation of that term in another statute, for where the 
purposes or contexts are different the terms may take on different meanings.”); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos 
Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 501 (1992) (“This Court . . . has not inflexibly required the same term to be interpreted 
in the same way for all purposes.”); Ezpeleta v. Sisters of Mercy Health Corp., 800 F.2d 119, 122 (7th Cir. 1986) 
(“Similar sounding phrases often have different meanings when applied in different legal contexts.”).  
 4. See JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 173 (2018). 
 5. Id. at 174. 
 6. Id. 
 7. See id. at 175. 
 8. Id. at 214. 
 9. I am indebted to the many scholars who have written about aspects of this transformation in far greater 
detail, and particularly to Charles McCurdy for introducing me to the concept of general constitutional law in his 
Salmon P. Chase Lecture in 2018. See Charles W. McCurdy, The Problem of General Constitutional Law: 
Thomas McIntyre Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 1868-1878, 
18 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 1 (2020). This Essay aims to show how the debates in different eras fit together and 
how the modern problems that Judge Sutton addresses are fundamentally the product of shifts in understanding 
of rights precipitated by the legal realist movement. The argument is descriptive, without taking any normative 
position about the proper use of history. 
 10. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949) (mentioning “rights derived from 
the Constitution of the United States”). 
 11. SUTTON, supra note 4, at 174 (“There is no reason to think, as an interpretive matter, that constitutional 
guarantees of independent sovereigns, even guarantees with the same or similar words, must be construed in the 
same way.”). 
  
No. 5] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BEFORE REALISM 1435 
no single jurisdiction was supreme the in exposition of those rights. With the 
ascendancy of legal realism, however, all of this changed.  
Part I begins by exploring debates in the late 1780s about whether state 
constitutional provisions could be used to identify rights against the federal gov-
ernment. What these debates reveal is a prevalent understanding of bills of rights 
as declaratory. On this view, rights were merely recognized in, and not created 
by, their placement in a constitution. Consequently, many Americans thought it 
possible to ascertain the rights that operated against the federal government by 
looking to state declarations of rights. 
Of course, the Founders eventually opted for amendments—now known as 
the Bill of Rights—which then led to the question addressed in Part II: What, if 
any, relevance did federal constitutional provisions have when trying to ascertain 
limits on state power? Today, we typically answer this question quickly: The Bill 
of Rights did not apply to states before the passage of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.12 Indeed, that seems to be the holding of Barron v. Baltimore.13 “As Bar-
ron confirms,” Judge Sutton states, “the key individual rights guarantees in the 
U.S. Constitution originally restricted the federal government.”14 
This conventional wisdom is sort of true. But from a historical perspective, 
it conceals a different way of understanding the source and operation of rights. 
Barron held that federal courts lacked federal-question jurisdiction to hear rights 
claims against state governments.15 But Barron in no way resolved a lively de-
bate about the declaratory nature of enumerated rights. The rights mentioned in 
state declarations and in the federal constitution were often conceptualized as a 
species of general law, not as a form of enacted law that one would expect to 
vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. State courts could—and often did—refer 
to the federal constitution and other state constitutions as evidence of the rights 
that operated against their governments. 
Part III then considers the impact of the Fourteenth Amendment. The cru-
cial issue that emerged after 1868 was not—as we usually assume—identifying 
which rights the Fourteenth Amendment created (or, to use the modern lingo, 
“incorporated”) against the states. Those rights already existed.16 Rather, the 
central controversy in the late nineteenth century was the extent to which the 
Fourteenth Amendment added a new way of enforcing these rights. 
Part IV then considers the collapse of this earlier understanding of rights 
under the weight of legal realism. Once legal realism took the reins, with rights 
viewed in a positivist light, the notion of general fundamental rights became un-
sustainable on its own terms. Rights were not the creature of nature or some im-
agined social contract, realists implored. Rather, rights were a creature of posi-
tive law. 
 
 12. See SUTTON, supra note 4, at 12. 
 13. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 251–52 (1833). 
 14. SUTTON, supra note 4, at 12.  
 15. Barron, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) at 251–52. 
 16. The question of “political rights”—that is, rights to participation in the administration of government, 
like voting, legislative eligibility, and juror eligibility—were analyzed differently. See PAMELA BRANDWEIN, 
RETHINKING THE JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF RECONSTRUCTION 61 (2011).  
  
1436 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2020 
This Essay highlights two shifts that emerged from this new understanding 
of constitutional rights. First, realism suggested that there was not one set of fun-
damental rights but rather fifty-one sets of constitutionally created rights.17 In 
this way, it became more persuasive to argue—as did Justice Frankfurter,18 then 
Justice Brennan,19 and now Judge Sutton—that states ought to interpret their 
constitutions as independent sources of law, without being necessarily tied to 
federal rights. Indeed, as Judge Sutton notes, the idea that “differently situated 
sovereigns” would happen to have identical rights “often seems inexplicable” 
given modern premises about constitutional interpretation.20 
At the same time, however, the notion that the Fourteenth Amendment had 
actually created rights—not simply secured them—suggested that federal author-
ities, and particularly federal judges, were supreme in their exposition. A right 
created by the federal constitution was a right over which states had no claim of 
interpretive authority. The path was thus laid for greater federal supremacy in the 
definition of constitutional rights.  
The controversies that have engaged Judge Sutton are the product of these 
developments. Whether we self-identify as legal realists or not, the terrain of 
rights discourse was fundamentally reshaped by the triumph of legal realism 
nearly a century ago. 
I. STATE ENUMERATED RIGHTS AS LIMITS ON FEDERAL POWER 
Americans today usually talk about rights as a creature of constitutional 
law. Identifying these rights, therefore, requires either explicit constitutional text, 
as with the rights of free exercise, free speech, and so forth, or else at least a 
plausible textual hook, as with “substantive” due process rights or Ninth Amend-
ment rights.21 Either way, though, the ultimate source of constitutional rights is 
the Constitution.22 The terminology alone—“constitutional rights”—suggests as 
much. 
 
 17. Of course, there weren’t fifty-one states earlier in the twentieth century, but you get the point.  
 18. See, e.g., Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59–69 (1947) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); FELIX 
FRANKFURTER, THE PUBLIC AND ITS GOVERNMENT 74–75 (1930). 
 19. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. 
L. REV. 489, 491 (1977) (“State constitutions, too, are a font of individual liberties, their protections often ex-
tending beyond those required by the Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law.”). 
 20. SUTTON, supra at 4, at 174–75.  
 21. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 
949 (1973) (“A neutral and durable principle may be a thing of beauty and a joy forever. But if it lacks connection 
with any value the Constitution marks as special, it is not a constitutional principle and the Court has no business 
imposing it.”). 
 22. See, e.g., Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 571 (1949) (mentioning “rights derived from 
the Constitution of the United States”). Revealingly, Justice Jackson cited to Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Carr, 
which mentioned “rights secured . . . by the Constitution of the United States,” 272 U.S. 494, 507 (1926) (em-
phasis added). 
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But many Americans simply did not think that way in the eighteenth and 
nineteenth centuries. A principal reason why was their immersion in social-con-
tract theory.23 
In essence, social-contract theory was a backward-looking thought experi-
ment designed to justify, and to limit, governmental authority.24 The basic idea 
was straightforward. To understand the proper role of government, one can im-
agine a situation in which no government existed and then reconstruct the basic 
terms under which individuals would have unanimously agreed in a “social con-
tract” (or “social compact”25) to join together to form a political society—a body 
politic known as “the people.” Only after everyone had reached this unanimous 
agreement would the people then, under majority rule, form a system of govern-
ment in a constitution.26 
Social-contract theory was ubiquitous in American constitutional thought, 
although sometimes hidden in plain sight. Consider the very first sentence of the 
Constitution. In the Preamble, William Findley of Pennsylvania recognized dur-
ing the ratification controversy, “it is said, ‘We the People,’ and not ‘We the 
States,’ which therefore is a compact between individuals entering into society, 
and not between separate states enjoying independent power and delegating a 
portion of that power for their common benefit.”27 State constitutions, too, often 
began with a basic statement of the precepts of social-contract theory.28 
Americans widely thought that individuals entering into a social contract 
would have agreed that the body politic had to preserve natural liberty—the free-
dom that humans would enjoy in an imagined state of nature—and had to guar-
antee certain positive rights, which Theophilus Parsons described as “the equiv-
alent every man receives, as a consideration for the rights he has surrendered.”29 
 
 23. This Part draws from an earlier blog post. See Jud Campbell, The Bill of Rights and Social Contract 
Theory, BALKINIZATION (Apr. 13, 2017), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/04/the-bill-of-rights-and-social-con-
tract.html. 
 24. Id.  
 25. The term “social compact” is more historically accurate, but I want to avoid the possibility of confusion 
with the separate historical debate over the nature of the union, including the “compact theory” of Thomas Jef-
ferson and others. 
 26. See Jud Campbell, Republicanism and Natural Rights at the Founding, 32 CONST. COMMENT. 85, 89 
(2017).  
 27. Pennsylvania Ratification Convention Debates (Dec. 1, 1787) (remarks of William Findley), in 2 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 447–48 (Merrill Jensen ed., 1976) (em-
phasis omitted); see also Luther Martin, Genuine Information IV, (Jan. 8, 1788), in THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 296, 297 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (“It 
is in its very introduction declared to be a compact between the people of the United States as individuals . . . 
[rather than] by the States as States in their sovereign capacity.”) (emphasis omitted). See generally Jonathan 
Gienapp, The Myth of the Constitutional Given: Enumeration and National Power at the Founding, 69 AM. U. 
L. REV. FORUM 183, 194–209 (2020) (discussing these debates about the preamble). 
 28. See, e.g., MASS. CONST. of 1780, pmbl. (“The body politic is formed by a voluntary association of 
individuals: it is a social compact, by which the whole people covenants with each citizen, and each citizen with 
the whole people, that all shall be governed by certain laws for the common good.”); N.H. CONST. of 1784, art. 
1 (“All men are born equally free and independent: Therefore, all government, of right, originates from the people, 
is founded in consent, and instituted for the general good.”). 
 29. Theophilus Parsons, Essex Result, in MEMOIR OF THEOPHILUS PARSONS 359, 367 (Boston, Ticknor & 
Fields 1861). 
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These positive rights were rules about what the government had to do, like pro-
vide for trial by jury, and what the government could not do, like impose cruel 
and unusual punishments. 30  Consequently, as Thomas Jefferson explained, 
rights included not only “unceded portions of right”—that is natural rights, like 
“freedom of religion”—but also “certain fences which experience has proved 
peculiarly efficacious against wrong, and rarely obstructive of right,” like “trial 
by jury, Habeas corpus laws, [and] free presses.”31 
For those who thought that individual rights were guaranteed in the social 
contract, it was unnecessary to enumerate them in a constitution or declaration 
of rights. The rights already existed. That did not mean that declaring rights was 
worthless; enumeration, for instance, might facilitate the political and judicial 
defense of rights. Declarations, Larry Kramer points out, could give rights “a 
degree of explicitness and clarity.”32 But crucially, as historians have broadly 
recognized, 33  enumeration was mostly a declaratory exercise. 34  The Ninth 
Amendment, with its reference to other rights “retained by the people,” reflects 
the same idea.35 
The Framers of the federal Constitution famously omitted a bill of rights. 
But the omission, they frequently argued, was inconsequential.36 In part, their 
argument rested on the inherent fundamentality of certain rights.37 “A Bill of 
Rights,” George Nicholas explained at the ratification convention in Virginia, “is 
only an acknowledgement of the pre-existing claim to rights in the people. They 
 
 30. Jud Campbell, Judicial Review and the Enumeration of Rights, 15 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 569, 576–
79 (2017).  
 31. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Noah Webster, Jr. (Dec. 4, 1790), in 18 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS 
JEFFERSON 131, 132 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1971). 
 32. LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
51 (2004). 
 33. See, e.g., John Phillip Reid, The Authority of Rights at the American Founding, in THE NATURE OF 
RIGHTS AT THE AMERICAN FOUNDING AND BEYOND 67, 97 (Barry Alan Shain ed., 2007); GORDON S. WOOD, 
THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 295 (1969); see also Michael W. McConnell, Tradi-
tion and Constitutionalism Before the Constitution, 1998 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 197 (“Our written Constitution 
presupposes an established set of fundamental rights not created by the Constitution but protected or preserved 
by it.”). 
 34. See, e.g., Suzanna Sherry, Natural Law in the States, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 171, 171–72 (1992); Suzanna 
Sherry, The Founders’ Unwritten Constitution, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1127, 1157–58 (1987); William Michael 
Treanor, Judicial Review Before Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 502 (2005). A caveat is that enumerating rights 
in a constitution was also a way of “recognizing the fundamentality of positive rights not supported by custom.” 
Campbell, supra, note 30, at 577.  
 35. Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 20 (1988). Michael 
McConnell, however, views enumeration as a critical step in recognizing the constitutional status of rights. See 
Michael W. McConnell, Natural Rights and the Ninth Amendment: How Does Lockean Legal Theory Assist in 
Interpretation?, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 1, 19–20 (2010). But see KURT T. LASH, THE LOST HISTORY OF THE 
NINTH AMENDMENT 82 (2009) (“In sum: The text of the Ninth Amendment prevents interpretations of enumer-
ated rights that negatively affect the unenumerated retained rights of the people. . . . [T]he fact of enumeration . . . 
[cannot be] relied upon to suggest the necessity or superiority of enumeration.”) (emphasis omitted). 
 36. See Campbell, supra note 30, at 572, 576–77. 
 37. See id.  
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belong to us as much as if they had been inserted in the Constitution.”38 This was 
a common refrain.39 
But Federalists also made frequent reference to the sufficiency of state-
level rights guarantees. “The state Declarations of Rights are not repealed by this 
Constitution, and being in force are sufficient,” Connecticut delegate Roger 
Sherman insisted toward the end of the Philadelphia Convention.40 For those 
used to thinking about constitutional rights in positivist terms, this looks like a 
bizarre argument. Michael Klarman describes Sherman’s position as “surpris-
ingly weak” and “hard to fathom.”41 How, we might ask, could state constitu-
tions possibly limit federal power? The idea seems to turn federal supremacy on 
its head. 
If we view Sherman’s argument through the lens of social-contract theory, 
however, it actually makes good sense. The original source of sovereignty, after 
all, was the consent of the people to the social contract.42 Unlike state bodies 
politic, however, the federal body politic was about to be formed through a par-
tial delegation of sovereignty from state bodies politic—not through the pre-
sumed agreement of every individual in the entire country.43 “[W]e are not work-
ing on the natural rights of men not yet gathered into society, but upon those 
rights, modified by society,” Edmund Randolph explained during the Philadel-
phia Convention.44 And this reveals why Sherman disclaimed any need for a 
federal bill of rights.45 The rights belonged to individuals, and therefore state 
bodies politic could not grant power to violate them any more than states could 
violate those rights themselves. 
Other Federalists drew on social-contract theory to make the same argu-
ment.46 Individual rights were “already provided for by the State Constitutions,” 
Tench Coxe insisted, “and relating only to personal rights, they could not be 
mentioned in a contract among sovereign states.”47 Importantly, Coxe was not 
denying federal sovereignty by adopting the proto-Confederate position that the 
Constitution was simply a glorified treaty—a “compact under the style & title of 
 
 38. Virginia Ratification Convention Debates (June 16, 1788) (remarks of George Nicholas), in 10 THE 
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 1334 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 1993). 
Interestingly, the term “bill of rights” was much less prevalent in the United States until the twentieth century. 
See GERARD N. MAGLIOCCA, THE HEART OF THE CONSTITUTION: HOW THE BILL OF RIGHTS BECAME THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS 5 (2018). 
 39. See Jud Campbell, Natural Rights and the First Amendment, 127 YALE L.J. 246, 299–300 (2017). 
 40. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 588 (Max Farrand ed., 1911). 
 41. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 
552 (2016). 
 42. This is what James Wilson was talking about when he wrote, “The sovereign, when traced to his source, 
must be found in the man.” Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 458 (1793) (Wilson, J., concurring); see 
Campbell, supra note 26, at 88–89. 
 43. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 109–10. 
 44. 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, supra note 40, at 137. 
 45. Id. at 138.   
 46. See, e.g., [Samuel Tenney], Alfredus (Jan. 18, 1788), reprinted in 28 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF 
THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 86, 88–89 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2017).  
 47. Tench Coxe, An American Citizen IV: On the Federal Government (Oct. 21, 1787), reprinted in 13 
THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 431, 434 (John P. Kaminski & Gas-
pare J. Saladino eds., 1981). 
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a Constitution,” as Thomas Jefferson infamously declared in 1798.48 Rather, 
Coxe was restating the standard Federalist position that the Constitution would 
form a national body politic through a delegation of sovereignty rather than 
through an original social contract among individuals.49 
II. FEDERAL ENUMERATED RIGHTS AS LIMITS ON STATE POWER 
The conventional wisdom is that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the 
states.50 The full picture is more complicated. For those in the nineteenth century 
who understood the federal amendments as merely declaratory of existing rights, 
the federal amendments supplied evidence of the people’s rights just like the var-
ious provisions of state constitutions. Rights, on this view, were declared and 
secured by constitutions, not created by them. 
The Georgia Supreme Court was particularly vocal in embracing this 
view.51 For example, in Nunn v. State,52 the defendant challenged the validity of 
a Georgia concealed-carry restriction based on a right to keep and bear arms that 
was not explicitly mentioned in the Georgia constitution. Writing for the Court, 
Chief Justice Joseph Lumpkin began by citing cases from other states explicating 
the scope of the right.53 “It is true,” he acknowledged, “that these adjudications 
are all made on clauses in the State Constitutions.”54 That, however, was a dis-
tinction without a difference, because “these instruments confer no new rights on 
the people which did not belong to them before.”55 Rather, the right to bear arms 
was a right “guarantied to British subjects” and “one of the fundamental princi-
ples, upon which rests the great fabric of civil liberty.”56 Moreover, Chief Justice 
Lumpkin pointed out, the Second Amendment to the federal constitution had, “in 
declaring that the right of the people to keep and bear arms . . . should not be 
infringed, only reiterated a truth announced a century before [in the English Bill 
of Rights].”57 
Some courts, he admitted, had denied that the rights mentioned in the fed-
eral amendments were limits on state power.58 But Chief Justice Lumpkin was 
 
 48. KENTUCKY RESOLUTIONS OF 1798 AND 1799, reprinted in 4 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE 
SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS OF THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 540 (2d ed. 1863). 
 49. To be sure, Anti-Federalists had reasonable arguments on the other side. See, e.g., 2 THE COMPLETE 
ANTI-FEDERALIST 254, 376 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981). My only goal here is to recover a lost strand of Feder-
alist thought, not to pick sides. 
 50. See, e.g., SUTTON, supra note 4, at 12 (citing Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833)).  
 51. For many more cases from a variety of states, see Jason Mazzone, The Bill of Rights in the Early State 
Courts, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1, 32–55 (2007). The classic treatment of these “Barron contrarians” is AKHIL REED 
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION 153–57 (1998); see also WILLIAM DAVENPORT 
MERCER, DIMINISHING THE BILL OF RIGHTS: BARRON V. BALTIMORE AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF AMERICAN 
LIBERTY 189–99 (2017). 
 52. 1 Ga. 243 (1846). 
 53. Id. at 247–49. 
 54. Id. at 249. 
 55. Id.  
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 250.  
  
No. 5] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BEFORE REALISM 1441 
invoking them in a different way. “[T]he people of the several States, in ratifying 
[the federal amendments] in their respective State conventions, have virtually 
adopted them as beacon-lights to guide and control the action of their own legis-
latures, as well as that of Congress.”59 Consequently, the declaration of an “un-
alienable right” in the federal constitution affirmed the existence of that right “at 
the bottom of every free government.”60 These protections, he explained, were 
“as perfect under the State as the national legislature, and cannot be violated by 
either.”61 
But viewing rights as derived from nature or the social compact—rather 
than from their constitutional enumeration—did not deprive the government of 
authority to regulate them by law. This idea sounds discordant to modern ears, 
but it was harmonious to nineteenth-century jurists.62 As understood from the 
founding through the early twentieth century, natural rights were regulable in 
promotion of the public good.63 “True liberty,” James Iredell noted, “consists in 
such restraints, and no greater, on the actions of each particular individual as the 
common good of the whole requires.”64 “[T]he right to speak and act,” American 
patriot James Otis explained at the onset of the colonial conflict, “is limited by 
the law—Political liberty consists in a freedom of speech and action, so far as 
the laws of a community will permit, and no farther.”65 And because of this def-
inition of natural rights, judges had very little room to overturn legislative judg-
ments about how these rights could be curtailed.66 
Consequently, and quite confusingly to modern readers, the regulability of 
rights meant that recognizing a common set of rights, applicable against the state 
and federal governments alike,67 did not necessarily mean that those rights had 
the same legal boundaries.68 These rights, Chief Justice Ringo of the Arkansas 
Supreme Court summarized in State v. Buzzard, did not forbid “such regulations 
 
 59. Id. at 250–51. 
 60. Id. at 250. 
 61. Id. at 251. Other judges reached similar conclusions. See, e.g., State v. Buzzard, 4 Ark. 18, 43 (1842) 
(opinion of Lacy, J.) (“Many of these rights [enumerated in the Bill of Rights] lie behind the Constitution, and 
existed antecedent to its formation and its adoption. They are embodied in its will, and organized by its power, 
to give them greater sanctity and effect. They are written that they may be understood and remembered; and then 
declared inviolate and supreme, because they cannot be weakened or invaded without doing the government and 
citizen manifest injustice and wrong.”). 
 62. Victoria F. Nourse, A Tale of Two Lochners: The Untold History of Substantive Due Process and the 
Idea of Fundamental Rights, 97 CALIF. L. REV. 751, 752 (2009).    
 63. See Campbell, supra note 26, at 92–98; Nourse, supra note 62. 
 64. James Iredell’s Charge to the Grand Jury of the Circuit Court for the District of Massachusetts (Oct. 
12, 1792), in 2 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1789-1800, at 
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as might be found necessary to prevent [the] exercise [of these rights] from op-
erating prejudicially upon the private rights of others, or to the general interests 
of the community.”69 The guarantees of the right to keep and bear arms under 
the Arkansas constitution and the federal Second Amendment were “declaratory 
of the same right,” Justice Dickinson explained in the same case, yet states had 
the authority to restrict that right under a “police regulation,”70 and “[t]he police 
of a State is to be regulated by its own laws.”71 This understanding of rights 
opened the door to diversity among states in the legal content of rights, even 
though the rights were conceptually identical from state to state.72 Countless 
other judges in the nineteenth century took a similar approach.73 
In light of this history, the Supreme Court’s famous holding in Barron v. 
Baltimore seems more modest. Because the Court’s appellate jurisdiction to re-
view state court decisions was strictly limited to federal questions, it was enough 
for Chief Justice Marshall to say that the Takings Clause did not, as a matter of 
federal law, bind state governments.74 But in suits brought in state court, as well 
as suits brought in federal court in the first instance,75 the Takings Clause could 
still be invoked as declaratory of one of the “first principles of government”—a 
principle that bound the federal and state governments alike.76 Barron said noth-
ing to the contrary. As the New Jersey Supreme Court said in 1839: 
This principle [of compensation for takings] has been made by express en-
actment, a part of the Constitution of the United States; . . . but it has been 
decided that as a constitutional provision, it does not apply to the several 
States. Still . . . it is operative as a principle of universal law; and the leg-
islature of this State, can no more take private property for public use, with-
out just compensation, than if this restraining principle were incorporated 
into, and made part of its State Constitution.77 
In a world where rights were protected in the social contract before the framing 
of a government in a constitution, this view made perfect sense. The “Barron 
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contrarians,” as Akhil Amar calls them,78 were effectively taking the same posi-
tion that Federalists had taken in the late 1780s—just now in reverse. 
III. THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 
Modern interpretive controversies over the Fourteenth Amendment presup-
pose that the rights recognized are federal rights.79 This Part recovers a different 
understanding.80 In the decades after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the Supreme Court frequently described it as securing rights rather than 
creating them. The rights, in other words, were derived from already existing 
fundamental law. But while these rights were not originally enforceable in fed-
eral court under Barron v. Baltimore, perhaps the Fourteenth Amendment now 
made them subject to federal protection. 
The starting point for this exploration is the famous Slaughter-House 
Cases.81 The plaintiffs, invoking the newly enacted Fourteenth Amendment, 
challenged a Louisiana statute that restricted the location of slaughter-house op-
erations around New Orleans and that gave the Slaughter-House Company an 
exclusive license to operate “the live-stock landing and slaughter-house business” 
within that area.82 
Four of the Supreme Court justices voted for the plaintiffs.83 As Justice 
Field put it in his dissent, their argument had “support in the fundamental law of 
the country.”84 The state had broad authority to pass “regulations affecting the 
health, good, order, morals, peace, and safety of society,” Field explained, thus 
giving it lawful authority to restrict rights in all sorts of ways “not in conflict 
with any constitutional prohibitions, or fundamental principles.”85 But the state 
could not, “under the pretence of prescribing a police regulation,” pass a law that 
encroached upon “rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure 
against abridgment.”86 Notice the wording: secure—not create. The question 
that had to be asked, Field continued, was whether the Fourteenth Amendment 
“protect[s] the citizens of the United States against the deprivation of their com-
mon rights by State legislation.”87 The answer, he insisted, was yes. The amend-
ment was meant “to place the common rights of American citizens under the 
protection of the National government.”88 
These “common rights” did not necessarily enjoy identical legal protection 
in each state, Field wrote, echoing the point that Arkansas Chief Justice Ringo 
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had made decades earlier.89 “The exercise of these rights and privileges [of citi-
zenship], and the degree of enjoyment received from such exercise,” he noted, 
“are always more or less affected by the condition and the local institutions of 
the State, or city, or town where he resides.”90 Fundamental rights, it bears em-
phasis, were generally not the type of legal immunities that we tend to assume 
today; they were simply rights that the government could restrain only by law 
and only in promotion of the public good. “They are thus affected in State by the 
wisdom of its laws,” Field observed, describing the principle as “a result which 
follows from the constitution of society.”91 These rights did “not derive their ex-
istence from its legislation, and cannot be destroyed by its powers.”92 All of this 
should sound familiar. Field was expounding a theory of rights derived from so-
cial-contract theory. 
So what was the relationship of the Fourteenth Amendment to these rights? 
Field’s answer was clear:  
The amendment does not attempt to confer any new privileges or immuni-
ties upon citizens, or to enumerate or define those already existing. It as-
sumes that there are such privileges and immunities which belong of right 
to citizens as such, and ordains that they shall not be abridged by State 
legislation.93 
The Fourteenth Amendment did not create rights.94 And for that reason, as Field 
clarified in an opinion the following year, the Fourteenth Amendment did not 
“interfere[ ] in any respect with the police power of the State.”95 
Nonetheless, Field explained in his Slaughter-House Cases dissent, the 
Amendment had “profound significance and consequence” for the protection of 
these already extant “natural and inalienable rights.”96 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment, he stated later in the opinion, “was intended to give practical effect to the 
declaration of 1776 of inalienable rights, rights which are the gift of the Creator, 
which the law does not confer, but only recognizes.”97 How? By enabling means 
of federal enforcement.98 
In a separate opinion, Justice Bradley was even more emphatic about the 
declaratory nature of civil rights. “[E]ven if the Constitution were silent,” he 
wrote, “the fundamental privileges and immunities of citizens, as such, would be 
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no less real and no less inviolable than they now are. . . . Their very citizenship 
conferred these privileges.”99 The Fourteenth Amendment was designed merely 
“to provide National security against violation by the States” of these “funda-
mental rights” of citizenship;100 or, as Justice Swayne’s dissenting opinion de-
scribed them, “the fundamental principles of the social compact.”101 
Of course, the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases disagreed with Jus-
tice Field’s understanding of the “privileges or immunities of citizens of the 
United States.”102 These rights, Justice Miller announced for the majority, were 
rights of national citizenship, not state citizenship.103 The Fourteenth Amend-
ment did not “transfer the security and protection of all the civil rights . . . from 
the States to the Federal government.”104 To have done so, he argued, would 
have “radically change[d] the whole theory of the relations of the State and Fed-
eral governments.”105 Importantly, Miller was not denying the existence of the 
underlying rights that the dissenters invoked.106 He simply denied that the fed-
eral government, including federal courts, had responsibility for securing those 
rights, at least absent racial discrimination.107 
When federal courts had original jurisdiction in diversity cases, however, 
federal judges continued their earlier practice of recognizing general limits on 
state power.108 In Township of Pine Grove v. Talcott, for example, the Supreme 
Court upheld a municipal bond measure under principles of general constitu-
tional law even though state judicial precedents pointed toward the invalidity of 
the measure.109 “The question before us belongs to the domain of general juris-
prudence,” Justice Swayne explained.110 “In this class of cases this court is not 
bound by the judgment of the courts of the States where the cases arise. It must 
hear and determine for itself.”111 Writing for the Court in Loan Association v. 
Topeka the following year,112 Justice Miller explained that “[t]here are limita-
tions on [governmental] power which grow out of the essential nature of all free 
governments. Implied reservations of individual rights, without which the social 
compact could not exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to 
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the name.”113 Miller, in other words, agreed with Field about the existence of 
general fundamental rights even though he disagreed with Field’s conclusion that 
the Fourteenth Amendment made these rights federally enforceable.114 
But the jurisprudential fight was not over. Some justices still believed that 
the Fourteenth Amendment provided at least some security for a broader range 
of fundamental rights.115 The premises articulated in these decisions sounded 
exactly like the Court’s statements with respect to general constitutional law.116 
The scope of state authority over individual rights, Chief Justice Waite explained 
for the Court in Munn v. Illinois,117 was settled in the social contract. “When one 
becomes a member of society, he necessarily parts with some rights or privileges,” 
Waite wrote.118 “This does not confer power upon the whole people to control 
rights which are purely and exclusively private,” he continued, but the govern-
ment did have the authority to restrict rights “when such regulation becomes nec-
essary for the public good.”119 Consequently, “statutes regulating the use, or 
even the price of the use, of private property [had not] necessarily deprived an 
owner of his property without due process of law.”120 But then Waite ended with 
a cryptic suggestion: “Under some circumstances they may.”121 Perhaps, he in-
timated, some state regulations would violate the rights secured under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
For a while, the Court showed little willingness to run with this suggestion. 
In Davidson v. New Orleans,122 for example, Justice Miller adamantly denied 
that the Due Process Clause could warrant bringing most fundamental-rights 
claims into federal court.123 Takings of property without compensation “maybe 
violate some provision of the State Constitution,” Miller explained for the ma-
jority, “but the Federal Constitution imposes no restraints on the States in that 
regard.”124 What the Due Process Clause required, he insisted, was “a fair trial 
in a court of justice, according to the modes of proceeding applicable to such a 
case.”125 In a separate opinion, Justice Bradley reiterated his view that “arbitrary, 
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oppressive, and unjust” state abridgments of property rights abridged rights se-
cured by the Fourteenth Amendment.126 
In the decade that followed, however, the views of Justices Field and Brad-
ley gradually gained traction. “The Fourteenth Amendment . . . undoubtedly in-
tended not only that there should be no arbitrary deprivation of life or liberty, or 
arbitrary spoliation of property, but that equal protection and security should be 
given to all under like circumstances in the enjoyment of their personal and civil 
rights,” Justice Field declared for a unanimous court in Barbier v. Connolly, up-
holding a San Francisco laundry ordinance.127 The Fourteenth Amendment, he 
emphasized, was not meant to interfere with the police powers of the state.128 
But by highlighting the limits of state power, Field signaled a willingness to con-
sider the arbitrariness of state legislation under the auspices of Fourteenth 
Amendment law.129 
Later the same year, the Court considered a challenge to another San Fran-
cisco laundry ordinance in Soon Hing v. Crowley, again rejecting the claim out 
of hand.130 This time, however, the case was originally filed in federal court.131 
And Field—just as he had done in Barbier—treated it as one that raised a color-
able federal claim.132 “[State and local] regulations in this matter are not subject 
to any interference by the federal tribunals,” he explained, “unless they are made 
the occasion for invading the substantial rights of persons, and no such invasion 
is caused by the regulation in question.”133 After all, Barbier had upheld an anal-
ogous scheme, and “[n]o invidious discrimination is made against any one by the 
measures adopted.”134 Field carefully went through each of the distinctions in 
the statute, explaining its validity.135 And he further rejected the plaintiff’s claim 
that San Francisco had denied the “right to work”: 
However broad the right of every one to follow such calling and employ 
his time as he may judge most conducive to his interests, it must be exer-
cised subject to such general rules as are adopted by society for the com-
mon welfare. All sorts of restrictions are imposed upon the actions of men 
notwithstanding the liberty which is guaranteed to each. It is liberty regu-
lated by just and impartial laws.136 
Finally, Field rejected the plaintiff’s “principal objection” that the law “was 
adopted owing to a feeling of antipathy and hatred prevailing in the city and 
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county of San Francisco against the subjects of the Emperor of China resident 
therein.”137 A facially neutral statute, he explained, would not be “changed from 
a legitimate police regulation, unless in its enforcement it is made to operate only 
against the class mentioned.”138 
With these two laundry cases, Field had carefully laid the groundwork for 
a broader understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment.139 To be sure, the prin-
ciples he articulated were no libertarian panacea. “[G]eneral rules as are adopted 
by society for the common welfare” did not abridge the Fourteenth Amendment, 
he insisted—a point that courts would reiterate countless times in the decades to 
come.140 Nonetheless, Field had created an opening for federal suits that alleged 
“arbitrary” or “invidious” discrimination.141 
What body of law would courts use to evaluate the scope of state police 
powers under this framework? Cases at first suggested the use of general funda-
mental law.142 Justice Matthews’s decision for the Court in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 
for instance, stated that “the fundamental rights to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness”—as well as limits on governmental power over those rights—flowed 
from “the nature and the theory of our institutions of government” and “the prin-
ciples upon which they are supposed to rest.”143 These were, as Justice Bradley 
had put it in 1884, “primordial and fundamental rights” that the Fourteenth 
Amendment had “referred to,” not created.144 
Nonetheless, the actual legal rules that applied—both procedurally and sub-
stantively—in state and federal court often differed. From a procedural stand-
point, the Supreme Court recognized that “due process” and “equal protection” 
did not entail a need for uniform procedures from state to state, or even within a 
state.145 Instead, the people of each state could generally vary procedures accord-
ing to “their organic law providing for their own affairs.”146 The states had broad 
latitude when it came to the particulars of criminal and civil processes, such as 
how many jurors would sit on a jury, whether verdicts had to be unanimous, and 
so forth.147 “[T]he state has full control over the procedure in its courts, both in 
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civil and criminal cases,” the Court explained in Maxwell v. Dow, “subject only 
to the qualification that such procedure must not work a denial of fundamental 
rights or conflict with specific and applicable provisions of the Federal Consti-
tution.”148 
On the substantive side, courts often disagreed about how far the police 
powers extended.149 At first, it was state courts—not their federal counterparts—
that took the lead in recognizing limits on legislative power.150 “There are certain 
fundamental rights of every citizen which are recognized in the organic law of 
all our free American states,” the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court declared 
when striking down a wage regulation in 1891.151 These fundamental rights were 
judicially enforceable, the court explained, “even though the enactment of it is 
not expressly forbidden” by the state constitution.152 Throughout this era, state 
courts cited precedent from many jurisdictions—in-state, out-of-state, federal, 
and even English—when trying to ascertain the scope of the police powers.153 
But, of course, these decisions were not always consistent with one another.154 
The scope of state power was often in the eyes of the judge. 
Federal courts began more actively reviewing due process challenges in the 
mid-1890s.155 The hint that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
provided a mechanism for substantive review was around much earlier,156 but 
the Court now seemed more confident about the existence of substantive protec-
tions offered by the Fourteenth Amendment.157 These underlying limits, how-
ever, were still supplied by general principles—not ones that the Fourteenth 
Amendment created.  
The logic of “substantive” due process, after all, was simply that the gov-
ernment could only take away life, liberty, and property pursuant to law, and that 
legislative acts that violated fundamental social-contractarian principles were not 
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law.158 Consequently, the argument went, a deprivation of life, liberty, or prop-
erty in violation of the social contract also violated due process.159 “An ACT of 
the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of 
the social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative author-
ity,” Justice Chase had famously argued in Calder v. Bull.160 At root, then, the 
“substantive” limits on state authority were really questions of fundamental law, 
not of “due process.” And this appears to have been the Supreme Court’s initial 
view. The Fourteenth Amendment “conferred no new and additional rights, but 
only extended the protection of the Federal Constitution over rights of life, lib-
erty, and property that previously existed under all state constitutions,” the Court 
explained in 1894.161 Perhaps, then, the substantive dimensions of due process 
were questions of general fundamental law.162 
But just two years later, as Michael Collins has observed, the justices de-
cided a string of cases that started to treat these substantive restraints on legisla-
tive power as questions of federal law.163 “We should not be justified in holding 
the act to be in violation of the state constitution in the face of clear and repeated 
decisions of the highest court of the state to the contrary, under the pretext that 
we were deciding principles of general constitutional law,” the Supreme Court 
resolved in 1896.164 “We are therefore practically confined in this case to the 
inquiry whether the act in question, as it has been construed by the state courts, 
violates the federal constitution.”165 Whether a state law violated the Due Pro-
cess Clause, the Court explained, was one that the justices “must decide . . . in 
accordance with our views of constitutional law.”166 While it articulated due pro-
cess as a federal standard, however, the Court also suggested a need for deference 
to “state courts which are to pass upon the question of public use in light of the 
facts which surround in their own state.”167 The “deliberate judgment and ma-
tured thought of the courts of that state” thus deserved “very great respect,”168 
even regarding the application of a federal rule.  
Perhaps not surprisingly, then, state and federal courts engaged in a long-
running dialogue over the proper boundaries of state power. Federal and state 
courts constantly referenced each other’s decisions. 169 And sometimes there 
 
 158. See Randy E. Barnett & Evan D. Bernick, No Arbitrary Power: An Originalist Theory of the Due 
Process of Law, 60 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1599 (2019).   
 159. Id. 
 160. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 387–89 (1798). 
 161. Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486, 506 (1894). 
 162. See Collins, supra note 144, at 81 (“[W]hen lower federal courts resolved questions of rate-reasona-
bleness in the exercise of their diversity jurisdiction, it was less than clear whether federal due process as opposed 
to ‘general principles’ provided the relevant source of substantive law.”).  
 163. See id. at 71–72. 
 164. Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 155 (1896). 
 165. Id. at 156. 
 166. Id. at 159. 
 167. Id. at 160. 
 168. Id.; see also Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361, 367–69 (1905). 
 169. See, e.g., Murphy v. California, 225 U.S. 623 (1912); Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co. v. Matthews, 174 
U.S. 96 (1899); Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Ellis, 165 U.S. 150 (1897); McGuire v. Chi., B. & Q.R. Co., 131 Iowa 
340 (1906), aff’d, 219 U.S. 549 (1911); Farmers’ & Merchants’ Ins. Co. v. Dabney, 62 Neb. 213 (1901), aff’d 
  
No. 5] CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS BEFORE REALISM 1451 
were disagreements, though my cursory search only revealed one example of a 
state court flatly rejecting the reasoning of the Supreme Court.170 And there were 
times when state courts noted the “decisive” or “conclusive” effect of a Supreme 
Court decision in cases involving the scope of state police powers.171 “The ques-
tions arising under the federal Constitution will be first considered, for their de-
termination will largely dispose of those arising under the state Constitution,” 
the Supreme Court of Vermont stated in 1907.172 “It is needless to say that on 
the federal questions the decisions of the federal Supreme Court are controlling, 
so we shall not go much outside of them.”173 
IV. THE REVOLUTION OF LEGAL REALISM 
American understandings of rights fundamentally changed with the advent 
and eventual triumph of legal realism.174 Many realists agreed with certain un-
derpinning premises of rights jurisprudence. “The principle of the Lochner case 
is simple enough: that arbitrary restriction of men’s activities, unrelated in reason 
to the ‘public welfare,’ offends the Fourteenth Amendment,” then-professor Fe-
lix Frankfurter observed in 1917.175 “As to the principle,” Frankfurter noted, 
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“there is no dispute.”176 Rather, the problem emerged “in its application,” given 
the extent to which assessments of the public interest often turned on the judges’ 
personal views.177 
Realists were far more hostile, however, to the Court’s embrace of a de-
claratory theory of rights. Legal rights, they insisted, were the creature of law—
not something merely recognized by it.178 Law, for example, had played a mate-
rial role in producing the very same inequality that progressive legislation sought 
to correct.179 Redistributive progressive legislation, then, was not—as the Su-
preme Court had declared in Coppage v. Kansas—a form of redistribution for its 
own sake,180 interfering with the “legitimate . . . inequalities of fortune” that in-
hered in “the nature of things.”181 Rather, for critics of Lochner, these arguments 
about natural rights, social compacts, and so forth, were the “nonsense upon stilts” 
that Jeremy Bentham had decried a century earlier.182 As Justice Holmes fa-
mously explained: 
Books written about any branch of the common law treat it as a unit, cite 
cases from this Court, from the Circuit Courts of Appeals, from the State 
Courts, from England and the Colonies of England indiscriminately, and 
criticize them as right or wrong according to the writer’s notions of a single 
theory. It is very hard to resist the impression that there is one august corpus, 
to understand which clearly is the only task of any Court concerned. If there 
were such a transcendental body of law outside of any particular State but 
obligatory within it unless and until changed by statute, the Courts of the 
United States might be right in using their independent judgment as to what 
it was. But there is no such body of law. The fallacy and illusion that I think 
exist consist in supposing that there is this outside thing to be found. Law 
is a word used with different meanings, but law in the sense in which courts 
speak of it today does not exist without some definite authority behind it. 
The common law so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common 
law or not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State exist-
ing by the authority of that State without regard to what it may have been 
in England or anywhere else.183 
The Supreme Court, of course, eventually embraced this critique in Erie.184 
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Realism thus precipitated a powerful shift in the prevailing understanding 
of constitutional rights. In Palko v. Connecticut,185 for example, Justice Cardozo 
asked whether governmental appeals in a criminal case were “unlawful by force 
of the Fourteenth Amendment”186 in light of the rights that Fifth Amendment 
“creates.”187 The test of incorporation harkened back to an earlier conception of 
fundamental law, asking whether these rights reflected a “principle of justice so 
rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as funda-
mental.” 188  But the way that Justice Cardozo talked about the Fourteenth 
Amendment hardly reflected the earlier view that it left state authority exactly as 
it stood before. The question at hand, Cardozo explained, was ascertaining the 
“domain of liberty, withdrawn by the Fourteenth Amendment from encroach-
ment by the states.”189 The linguistic drift was striking. 
With the notion that incorporated rights were federal rights came a natural 
assumption that these rights were uniquely subject to federal definition. “[T]he 
task of translating the majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights . . . into concrete 
restraints on officials dealing with the problems of the twentieth century, is one 
to disturb self-confidence,” Justice Jackson explained in West Virginia Board of 
Education v. Barnette.190 “But we act in these matters not by authority of our 
competence but by force of our commissions.”191 It was, in other words, the duty 
of the judge—and particularly the federal Supreme Court—to ascertain and ap-
ply constitutional boundaries on governmental power.192 “The very purpose of a 
Bill of Rights,” Jackson asserted, “was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities 
and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by courts.”193 
Judges were now to be primary authority in ascertaining the meaning of these 
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preferred freedoms.194 Gone was the earlier notion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment simply left police powers where they originally stood, with states having 
the power to restrict rights in promotion of the public good.195 
For the next several decades, the Supreme Court justices divided over just 
how broadly to interpret federal constitutional rights—and particularly those that 
operated against the states. Some justices took a capacious view of the Bill of 
Rights and insisted that the Fourteenth Amendment fully “incorporated” those 
rights against the states.196 Others had a more limited reading of enumerated 
rights and also thought that the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Pro-
cess Clause was even narrower.197 But by this point, everyone agreed that what-
ever these rights entailed, all of them were defined by a federal standard, with 
supreme interpretive authority resting in the Supreme Court.198 Gone were the 
days of general law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The realist movement transformed American constitutional jurisprudence. 
The notion that the Fourteenth Amendment had actually created new federal 
rights—and not simply secured existing fundamental rights—suggested that fed-
eral authorities, and particularly federal judges, were supreme in their exposition. 
At the same time, though, it suggested that state constitutional rights might have 
a different meaning than their federal counterparts. Both the malady and the an-
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